In 2010 The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a 'disciplined democracy' to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via 'ceasefire capitalism', which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total 'victory'
Although many people doubtlessly suffered under sanctions and military misrule, the regime successfully directed the economy eastwards, distributing booming natural resource export revenues to itself and its supporters. From 1988-2010, Myanmar's gross domestic product increased from $12.6bn to $45.4bn, while imports rose from $246m to $4.8bn, exports, from $167m to $8.7bn, and foreign investment, from $4m to $8.3bn. 7 China's growing influence was similarly tolerated as the price of Beijing's massive arms transfers, foreign investment, and diplomatic backing. Despite arousing popular and elite concern, Chinese influence did not suddenly escalate to intolerable levels that could explain an abrupt liberalisation.
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Suggestions that the regime feared a popular uprising are also questionable. Having bloodily suppressed pro-democracy protests in 1988, the army imprisoned, repressed and disorganised its leading forces, the NLD and the '88 Generation of Students. Despite minor 'hit-and-run' protests in Yangon, democratic opposition was largely quelled, with anti-regime elements fleeing abroad and pursuing opposition through exile NGOs. 9 Their weakness was symbolised through the '9-9-99' campaign, which failed to initiate a hoped-for mass uprising in 1999. Meanwhile, although ethnic-minority rebellions initially persisted in the borderlands, as the army doubled in size, most signed ceasefires by the mid-1990s. 10 The only serious post-1988 mass unrest was in 2007, when around 100,000 Buddhist monks demonstrated in major cities against price rises and demanded political change. However, as Zöllner documents, the wider population remained overwhelmingly passive, and the protests were quickly and brutally dispersed. 11 Growing economic disparity, including that induced by sanctions, had not spurred revolt; instead, as one ethnic-minority leader recalls, 'when the people became poorer and poorer, they became more apolitical... because they were only
[focused] on their survival'. 12 Anthropological studies concur that, despite widespread dislike of the regime, the population's general response was depoliticisation, atomisation, mysticism, 4 and a focus on daily survival. 13 In surveys conducted in 2010-2011, only 8% of respondents were prepared to join political protests, and only 6% anticipated Arab Spring-style unrest.
14 Many opposition leaders interviewed confirmed their inability to mobilise serious societal protest. 15 As one laments: 'the 2007 Saffron Revolution ended in failure. They [the regime] can control the whole country... they have won everything in Myanmar'.
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Even if these popular explanations contained some truth, their fundamental weakness is an inability to explain earlier attempts to enact regime transition, which preceded the 'triggers' that supposedly account for the 2010 transition. In 1990, elections were held for a constituent assembly, prior to governmental elections. From 1993 From -1996 , the regime convened another constituent assembly, the National Convention (NC , 1993) . 32 Finer, "Retreat to the Barracks," 18. 33 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 22. 34 Jones, "Political Economy of Myanmar's Transition," 13.
they had 'vetoed' in 1996. It is in this sense that the 'periphery' is central in explaining
Myanmar's transition.
The Military Regime's Goals and Strategy
Despite much emphasis on the struggle between democrats and autocrats after 1988, arguably the most critical axis of socio-political conflict since Burma's independence has been centre- SLORC's generals now believed that moves to restore democracy in 1990 had been 'premature', and consequently sought an orderly transition to a constrained -'disciplined', or 'discipline-flourishing' -democracy. 50 Reflecting SLORC's 'national causes', the regime insisted that the NC be guided by several non-debatable 'basic principles', which sought to constrain Myanmar's centrifugal forces by establishing a strong central state with a leading role for the military in maintaining national integrity (see Figure 3) . However, opposition forces again resisted these constraints. The NLD walked out of the NC in 1995 and, more importantly, several ceasefire groups demanded greater autonomy than SLORC dared concede. Lacking the strength to simply impose its will, SLORC had to abandon the NC in 
Transformations in Political Economy and State-Building in Myanmar, 1988-2010
The basic answer is that the balance of power between regime and opposition forces shifted fundamentally in the former's favour, enabling it to diminish (though not destroy) the threats that had prompted its intervention and withdraw on its own terms. This outcome stemmed from the transformation of Myanmar's geopolitical and economic context, which supported the regime's strategies to centralise power and reduce centrifugal challenges, giving it the confidence to resume Myanmar's forced march to 'disciplined democracy'.
The Post-Cold War Shift 'from Battlefields to Marketplaces'
Though rooted in local grievances, Burma's communist and separatist insurgencies were always sustained externally to a significant degree. This shift strengthened SLORC against opposition groups in three ways. First, neighbouring states pushed insurgents to sign ceasefires. Second, the state was rescued from near-bankruptcy by an influx of foreign investment and trade deals in logging, fisheries and mining, with rents now flowing to the regime rather than rebels. Foreign investment boomed from $58m in 1990/91 to $800m by 1996/7, much of which went to military-linked firms.
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Hardwood timber exports alone earned $160m annually from 1988-1995. 56 Thai loggers also built roads through the borderlands, facilitating military penetration. 57 Third, the regime evaded the Western arms embargo, importing over $2bn of predominantly-Chinese weaponry with assistance from Singaporean banks.
58
These developments stabilised the regime, boosted the ceasefire drive, and gave SLORC the confidence to convene the first NC, since 'the conditions for peace and stability 71, no. 4 (1998-1999 Part of the answer is coercion, enabled by the transformed political economy context. Using newly-available resources, SLORC doubled the army's size and built a powerful military intelligence apparatus that penetrated most opposition groups. 60 Having already incarcerated many pro-democracy activists, SLORC repressed the NLD after its NC boycott, provoking mass defections and the closure of all its offices outside the capital. By the early 2000s, the pro-democracy movement had largely been 'crushed', with only Western backing enabling its survival. 61 Military penetration of the borderlands also increased sharply. The expanded army was able to establish garrisons in ceasefire groups' territory, shifting from seasonal counterinsurgency campaigns to permanently hold territory. The regime thereby captured rebel groups' natural resource bases and forcibly relocated their supporters, while the state was enabled to 'tax, monitor and micromanage the populace'. 62 The Tatmadaw also exploited rebel divisions, co-opting splinter groups to fight their former comrades.
However, also important was the co-optation of borderlands elites and the centralisation of politico-economic power through 'ceasefire capitalism'. Ethnic-minority rebels largely signed ceasefires out of war weariness, poverty and a desire for development.
Accordingly, their subsequent incorporation into a national system of rule was primarily pursued through economic means: development spending; joint business ventures; and the rerouting of economic flows to benefit the regime. As one junta leader explains, these strategies sought 'to enhance the centripetal forces holding the country together by... nullify[ing] the centrifugal forces made up of the secession-seeking minority/ national races, insurgents, narcotics groups, and even the straggling communists, by inviting them back to the legal fold'.
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The ceasefires established a basic quid pro quo: in exchange for suspending armed struggle, former rebels would receive government development assistance, retain control over some territory and checkpoints, and continue cross-border trading, initially including opium. borderlands development and social services to promote the 'consolidation of national unity', which was regarded as the 'basic foundation... of [a] democratic system'. 65 More important was the incorporation of ethnic-minority elites through their participation in capitalist economic development. This took two main forms. First, the regime initiated joint ventures with local elites to exploit the borderlands' natural resources, notably in logging, mining and agriculture, helping 'the regime to expand its military, administrative and economic reach into areas of the country where it previously had little or none'. 66 The army and ceasefire groups' militias guarded these operations, whilst local elites brokered transboundary investments via black market contacts. Foreign trade and overseas investment were again critical in enabling this strategy. Two-thirds of foreign investment went to just three resource-rich minority states. 67 Export revenues financed patronage networks centred on army regional commanders, who also dispensed resource concessions to local elites who brokered ceasefires. 68 The alliances formed around extractive industries generated new power structures in the borderlands, which Callahan dubs '"emerging political complexes".. The money-laundering process highlights a crucial aspect of 'ceasefire capitalism':
the deliberate re-routing of economic flows to strengthen the central regime and weaken 'centrifugal forces'. Promoting economic development in the borderlands risked strengthening ceasefire groups. To avoid this, the regime increasingly centralised economic flows, making access dependent on loyalty to the state. Thus, mining permits issued to ceasefire groups initially insisted that at least 10% of their gemstones were sold through government-run auctions in Yangon. 71 However, by the mid-2000s, all gemstones mined by joint ventures had to be sold in this way, and most exports to China, Myanmar's major market, had been re-routed through Yangon, and later Naypyidaw. 72 By taking control of valuable jade mines, the Tatmadaw 'shut out' many businesses linked to the KIO, redirecting lucrative rents to itself and its allies. 73 Similarly, timber exports were redirected from crossborder roads, controlled and 'taxed' by the KIO, to Yangon's port, in order to 'squeeze the KIO out of the timber business and thus weaken their political position against the regime'. Despite this, the overall trajectory clearly favoured the regime, reducing many ceasefire group leaders' will and capacity to resume armed struggle. This allowed the SPDC to launch its 'roadmap' to 'disciplined democracy'.
Resuming the Roadmap
Like other military regimes, the Tatmadaw retreated from direct governmental control once it had sufficiently diminished the challenges that had prompted its intervention, notably ethnicminority insurgencies and pro-democracy forces, and found trustworthy civilian organisations to take over, in the form of the USDP.
The 2003 announcement of the 'roadmap to democracy' reflected the SPDC's growing confidence that insurgent threats, whilst definitely not eliminated, were sufficiently under control to permit a transition to 'disciplined democracy'. SPDC minister General David
Abel articulates this explicitly, stating that in the 1990s, 'we didn't have peace in the country... The mechanisms of democracy couldn't work, because we had these insurgencies.
Now that the insurgency has almost come to an end, we implemented... the roadmap'. 79 The change in centre-periphery power relations was reflected in the behaviour of ethnic-minority leaders. In the 1990s, some major ceasefire groups had boycotted the NC, some maintained separatist platforms, and others remained in armed rebellion. By 2004, virtually every group had signed a ceasefire, and the last major holdout, the Karen National Union, entered peace talks; all had abandoned separatism to pursue regional autonomy within the Union of Myanmar; and all major groups joined the NC, seeing the roadmap as the 'culmination of their ceasefire strategies', a chance to embed their post-1988 gains. by societal opposition in the 1990s. Subsequently, however, structural geopolitical and economic changes combined with the SPDC's coercive and economic statecraft tipped the balance of forces in its favour. The democratic opposition was repressed, while 'ceasefire capitalism' incorporated and reduced the perceived threat from Myanmar's 'centrifugal forces'. By diminishing the challenges that had prompted military intervention, and reducing effective resistance to its plans, the SPDC was enabled to impose its 'roadmap' to 'disciplined democracy'.
Although these shifting power relations sufficed to allow the regime to liberalise, this does not mean that centre-periphery conflict has ended. Certainly, the state's territorial reach and coercive power are greater than ever, and ethnic minorities now seek a future within, rather than apart from, the Union of Myanmar. Nonetheless, the strategies that enabled these results won the state few allies and precious little affection. Moreover, like most settlements Sein's reforms, the powerful interests embedded in 'ceasefire capitalism' have also perpetuated its predatory dynamics, generating deepening resentment. 83 How much the army and other conservative Bamar elites are prepared to concede to the minorities to achieve a genuine political settlement remains unclear. Although some modernisers accept that new strategies are required, the military -including the retired officers leading the USDP -fought for decades to impose its designs, and many may resist. Although military re-intervention in politics remains unlikely while unrest in the borderlands remains geographically contained, any escalation or spread of conflict -including the increasingly violent communal strife between Buddhists and Muslims -will severely escalate the risk. All of Myanmar's political forces, including opposition parties, recognise that they are steering a fine line between promoting reform and provoking a military backlash. Even so, and although Myanmar's armed groups may no longer seriously threaten the state's integrity, the Bamar elite may still need to learn that there can be no lasting peace without justice. 83 Jones, "Political Economy of Myanmar's Transition."
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